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*cover illlustration:* Symbols of China and Africa courtesy Dr. Ted Wu.

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

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Ned Munger

DR. DAVID CHANAIWA

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# FOREWORD

SCHOLARS AND LAYMEN seeking to understand Chinese foreign policy toward Africa during the second half of the twentieth century will find *Revolution and Foreign Policy: Sino-African Relations, 1949-1976,* by Edwin Clausen and Jack Bermingham, to be very informative and refreshing. The study is most significant because it discusses Chinese foreign policy in its entire context, consisting of the domestic exigencies emanating from the ideology and socioeconomic infrastructure of the Chinese society; of the Communist-capitalist cold war, especially the attempts by the United States to isolate China diplomatically; of the Sino-Soviet rivalry for the leadership of the Communist International; and of the on-the-spot realities of African ideologies, self-interests, and sensitivities. It is this new emphasis on the demands and constraints exerted by both the ideological and practical realities of post-World War II Africa that distinguishes this study from the previous ones.

With regard to the Chinese domestic context, the authors maintain that Chairman Mao Tse-tung was the principal architect of Chinese foreign policy, and that his conception of world order, of international Communism, of revolutionary changes, and of economic self-reliance was embodied in the form, the changes, and even the contradictions of Chinese policy. Under Mao's guidance the Chinese were able to integrate their ideology and practice, to explain the apparent contradictions and dichotomies, and to adapt their goals and strategies to the African milieu. Their national goals were to defend their territory, especially against Russian aggression in Mongolia, to ensure their sovereignty, to achieve economic self-reliance and prosperity, to maintain enough military preparedness and weaponry, to preserve their cultural and social cohesion against disruptive alien capitalist values, and to emerge from the isolation forced on them by the United States.

With regard to the African context, the authors see the emergence of post-World War II African nationalism, characterized by fervent anticolonialism, antiracism, antineocolonialism, and by a mass-oriented liberation struggle. African leaders were struggling to unite disparate ethnic and self-interest groups into a dynamic process of modern nation-building through the One Party System. Economically, the Africans were attempting to solve the formidable colonial legacies of dependency and underdevelopment. They needed to diversify the economy from its monocultural colonial basis, and to revamp the subsistence-oriented agriculture through mechanization and cooperatives in order to generate surplus, capital, and revenues. They needed immediate economic and technical assistance to undertake development in industry, communications, and education. More urgently, they needed to resolve the problem of unemployment caused by the post-World War II depression, by the increasing post-independence migration, especially of the young people, from the rural

to the urban areas, and by the colonial legacy of an urban-oriented, public education that produced more graduates than it could employ.

In addition, Africans were concerned about their role and status in world affairs, about the negative effect of the East-West cold war on their newly won independence and sovereignty, and about the intransigency of settler colonialism in Southern Africa. Thus, they organized Pan-Africanist conferences and formed the Organization of African Unity and liberation fronts. As the Chinese, the Soviets, and the Americans were to find out, the newly independent Africans were often very jealous and sensitive of their independence, sovereignty, and freedom, and were afraid of inadvertently substituting new imperialists in place of the outgoing Europeans.

Not only do the authors discuss the cultural milieu and objectives of Sino-African relations, they also place them in their proper historical sequence and perspective. The study, therefore, is analytical, situational, and historical. The first major phase of Sino-African relations was from 1949 to about 1963, during which period the Chinese made overtures of friendship and solidarity to both the African and Asian peoples who were struggling for their independence from European colonialism. At this stage Chinese national objectives were complementary to the African aspirations of independence, sovereignty, freedom, and nonalignment, as well as to antiimperialism and antiracism. The Chinese saw Africans as potential revolutionary allies who could be mobilized against the capitalist world of Western Europe and the hegemony of the Soviet Union. The Africans, especially those involved in the armed struggle against settler colonialism in Algeria, Kenya, Guinea-Bissau, and Southern Africa, perceived China as an emerging cradle of revolutionary socialism, to which they could turn for moral, diplomatic, and material support. The leaders of liberation movements actually expected financial aid, military training, and technical advice from the Chinese.

The highlights of this first phase were the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference of 1955, the establishment of Sino-African embassies with Egypt (1956) and with Morocco and Sudan (1958), China's recognition and support of the National Liberation Front of Algeria, and Chou En-lai's extensive tour of Africa in 1964. The guiding principles of this period, as agreed upon in the communiqué of the Bandung Conference and subsequently reiterated by Chou En-lai, were mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, and racial equality.

The next phase was the 1960s and was characterized on the African continent by an avalanche of newly independent states, by the formation of the O.A.U. and the intensification of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. The study shows that at this stage the Chinese met a number of diplomatic setbacks, which included the severance of relations and expulsion of the Chinese from the then Dahomey (Benin) and the Central African Republic in 1966, as well as the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah while he was in Peking. The major reason for these setbacks was that Chinese revolutionary idealism then was clashing with African realism. The Chinese would have preferred all the African states to undergo armed struggle before achieving independence, to overthrow the pro-

West, pro-capitalist, nationalist bourgeois presidents by nesting socialist rebellions, and to prevent the former colonial powers, the United States, and Russia from establishing neocolonialism in Africa. However, China had to reckon with the resistance of the conservative leaders in whom missionary Christianity and education had inculcated not only the doctrines of capitalist materialism and individualism but also of anti-Communism because of its ban on freedom of worship. Furthermore, most African leaders saw in the triangular rivalry between the United States, Russia, and China a wonderful opportunity to exploit the competition and obtain aid from the three of them.

As the authors point out, the Chinese emerged from this second phase after an adaptive metamorphosis largely caused by the exigencies of African realities. They changed to a position more attuned to the African environment—from sponsoring rebellions against them to tacit peaceful coexistence with anti-Communist, bourgeois African leaders and from anti-Americanism to the current Sino-American détente against the Soviet Union. Economically, cognizant of their lack of large amounts of capital and highly sophisticated machinery, the Chinese decided to concentrate on projects that were labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive, such as railway lines and agricultural cooperatives. In that way, they were making efficient use of land and labor, the internal resources that Africa had in abundance, and were assuring themselves of successes. The largest single Chinese aid project and the most spectacular achievement in Africa was the famous Tan-Zam railroad, completed in 1972. The Chinese aid also had the greatest impact in the socialist states of Tanzania, Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville, and Mali, where the leaders were striving for economic self-reliance.

Clausen and Bermingham have done a commendable job of analyzing, interpreting, and synthesizing a mass of data from both African and Asian sources into a concise, well-documented, and stimulating monograph. The work makes an important contribution to the study of Sino-African relations in particular as well as to African studies, Asian studies, and diplomatic history in general.

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# PREFACE

THIS ESSAY grew out of our belief that most of the literature discussing Sino-African relations has not given adequate consideration or weight to both regions. We hoped to develop a clearer framework for analysis by combining our respective insights on China and Africa. Our research began in 1975 in preparation for papers delivered at the annual Conference of the Association for Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast held in Honolulu in that year. The ideas that it contains were further developed during our presentation at the Western Conference of the Association for Asian Studies held in Colorado in 1977. Finally, the monograph is a revised and expanded version of the paper "China and Africa: 'Most Unequal Equals,'" presented during the First International Symposium on Asian Studies held in Hong Kong in 1979.

For China, Mao Tse-tung became the principal animator in the formation of Chinese foreign policy. Consequently, to determine the essence of policy required an understanding of Mao's thought. Much concern focuses on Mao's apparent contradictions and dichotomies.

To evaluate the African position in the relationship, we discussed common strands among the African states' historical experiences that transcended political frontiers. African nationalism and the Western colonial legacy are the two primary variables in the determination of African foreign policy. Post-independence positives in African states indicated that they remained applicable even after several coups had taken place, primarily because colonialism in Southern Africa and the struggle for nonalignment in independent states continued to be the major issues for Africans in foreign affairs.

Two major issues raised by our study need further exploration with respect to the study of the foreign relations of the People's Republic of China. First, a researcher, transcending a Western-biased methodology, should closely examine how Mao Tse-tung's world perspective functionally influenced Chinese foreign policy. Secondly, additional research should be directed at the contemporary Chinese world view and the way in which it has remained flexible without compromising its integrity.

From an African perspective our research indicated a significant void in the field of African diplomatic history. Scholars must direct some significant effort to alleviate this situation. Otherwise, African foreign policies will continue to be assessed in vague terms that express dependence and passive acceptance.

# REVOLUTION & FOREIGN POLICY: SINO-AFRICAN RELATIONS 1949-1976

*Jack Bermingham & Edwin G. Clausen*

## Introduction

An extensive literature discusses the relationship between the People's Republic of China and Africa prior to the death of Mao Tse-tung. This scholarship has been historiographically enigmatic, providing more questions than answers, more debates than agreement. The sources of the ambiguity are as complex as the issues concerned and as varied as the interpretations presented. First, there have been the proclivities of the researchers, the difficulties of intercultural understanding or empathy, and the problems of procuring materials pertinent to the reasoning behind the foreign policy decisions. Generally scholars have seen Mao Tse-tung as the animator of China's foreign policy, and though there would be disagreement over the degree to which policy bore his distinctive imprint or was subject to unexpected or impersonal forces, an understanding of the essence of Chinese policy must attempt to discover the underlying sentiments that informed the practices of the Chairman.[1]

Although it is crucial to understand Mao's reasoning, many analysts have been preoccupied with Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese context. The preoccupation has given rise to a second problem that has plagued many of the studies of the interaction between China and Africa: the failure seriously to consider the African environment.[2] Important developments such as African nationalism, Pan-Africanism, African socialism, Negritude, and Nonalignment are largely neglected. Many of the major books concentrate on Chinese activities in Africa rather than on Sino-African interaction.[3] Often this emphasis results from the authors' cultural or national myopticism, anti-communism, paternalism, protectionism, or economic self-interest. The problem is compounded by colonial perceptions which have limited many scholars' willingness or ability to adjust their images of Africa. Their interpretations remain flawed by visions of Africa as the "Dark Continent," filled with "warring tribes" and "tribesmen," instead of the realities of modern nation-states, political parties, and nationalistic leaders.[4] Africa is not inert and plastic—ready for pernicious molding at the hands of communists or for positive sculpturing by capitalists.[5]

Yet, many scholars have treated Africa primarily as a "battlefront" and "staging area" for communism and capitalism, characterizing Sino-African relations in terms of the Chinese "penetration" of Africa. African decision-making and indigenous perspectives reflecting historical forces that shape policy development have been ignored. Thus, Chinese foreign policy is perceived virtually as

self-seeking and self-perpetuating, with formulas, strategies, and expectations that have little to do with African realities.[6] These same analysts tend to exhibit a "superpower" syndrome that presupposes a world necessarily divided into communist and capitalist camps. Even the more "sophisticated" perspective of the Nixon-Kissinger quinary world articulated in President Nixon's Kansas City speech of July 1971 neglects Africa—except as an environment where the five powers interact or perhaps conflict.

## The Development of Sino-African Relations

Sino-African interaction has been fluid, changing in accordance with domestic and international developments. While the settlers of Southern Africa have viewed the Chinese as intent upon controlling Africa, the Africans, especially those in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, have sought to establish formal connections with the People's Republic of China. These Africans see the Chinese as allies against imperialists and colonizers.[7]

Chinese aid usually has been assessed by Africans as contributing to anti-imperialism and therefore to liberation, independence, and self-determination.[8] principles that have motivated the allocation of aid by the Chinese nonetheless have been portrayed as suspect by many people discussing Chinese economic assistance. When Chou En-lai outlined the program, "Eight Principles on Economic and Technical Assistance," many analysts surmised that such utterances were Janus-faced assertions masking hidden Chinese motives in Africa.[9] Despite Chinese reiteration that their economic aid was to be free or at low interest, was designed not to make the countries dependent on China, and was based on the principles of equality and equal benefit, and also that Chinese experts would live under the same conditions as the people of the recipient country, most analysts denied that reality bolstered the Chinese contentions.

Chinese assistance was often rooted in the soil of African nationalism and self-determination. The aid has been useful and was often given in such fashion as to win praise from African leaders.[10] Public praise of Chinese efforts was not uncommon, and perhaps was exemplified best by Mali's former President Modibo Keita. He paid warm homage "to the People's Republic of China for the low cost of its technical assistance, for the readiness of its technicians to adapt themselves to the lives of our people, for the speed and competence with which the projects are carried out one by one, and all these are done without the slightest intention of interfering in our internal affairs."[11] This view was reinforced by Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, who after admitting that initially he had been suspicious of Chinese motives, concluded: "We can say this now out of experience and not out of trust. Never once has the Chinese government tried to interfere with the political or economic policies of Tanzania. We are left with a deep sense of brotherly obligation."[12]

Despite the praise that Chinese economic assistance has elicited, the relationships between African states and the People's Republic have not always been cordial and smooth. Between 1949 and 1976 four stages of development in Sino-African relations can be delineated. The first period, 1949-1955, was characterized by Chinese attempts to establish contacts with, and to win recogni-

tion from, African states. During this time some African countries also made efforts to initiate contact with China, partly as a means of facilitating African independence and nonalignment. This "exploratory" period ended successfully with the convening of the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, April 18-24, 1955. Bandung was the first of successive Afro-Asian conferences, and of the 29 states in attendance, six were African: Egypt, Liberia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Libya, and the self-governing colony of Ghana. The conference became a symbol of Afro-Asian solidarity, anti-imperialism, anti-racism, nonalignment, and marked a watershed in Sino-African relations.[13] Chou En-lai, Abdul Nasser, and Jawaharlal Nehru emerged from the conference as the "three champions of Afro-Asian independence." During the next decade, Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism, neocolonialism, and racism and the "Bandung Spirit" permeated the major policy statements and slogans of Chinese foreign policy with respect to Africa.

The second stage, 1955-1960, was primarily a continuation of the spirit and goals established at Bandung. Chinese efforts at increasing contact through diplomatic recognition by African states, trade and commerce with Africans, strong support of liberation movements, and repetition of Afro-Asian solidarity conferences characterized the period. The distinctive feature of these six years was what one writer has described as "unity from above and unity from below."[14] "Unity from above" continued the policy of establishing contact with African states and their leaders, as witnessed by the expansion of commercial and diplomatic contacts between 1958 and 1960 with the newly independent "bourgeois" states of Algeria, Mali, Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, and Somalia. The "unity from below" referred to continued support of liberation movements that sought independence from colonialism, neocolonialism, and racism.

Egypt's recognition of China in May 1956 was the first diplomatic breakthrough. The establishment of formal relations was a spectacular success. Egypt was the most powerful independent African state, a center for all liberation movements' external offices, and the temporary home of many African political exiles. The Chinese indicated the importance of this new post by the appointment of the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ch'en Chia-k'ang, as ambassador. Subsequently, China intensified its diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties with Africa through formal delegations and nongovernmental Sino-African and international organizations, including the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Women's International Organization of Journalists, and the Afro-Asian Writers Association. China's delegation to the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference in Cairo in 1957 was prominent and active. This conference produced the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization—the institutional embodiment of the "Bandung spirit" and of Afro-Asian unity.

During this period Africans strengthened African independence and nonalignment by expanding contacts with China. Sekou Touré of Guinea considered it essential to establish relationships with China because France's isolation of the newly independent nation in reprisal for its liberation efforts made foreign assistance from non-Western nations necessary for survival. Also, African leaders from Southern Africa began to establish contact with China in their

quest for aid in their liberation struggles. These leaders were sensitive to Western criticism, leery of the communist "bogey" image, and full of hope for internal reform; their initial contacts with China therefore were low profile and usually were made through sympathetic third parties such as Egypt or Ghana.

The third stage, 1960-1971, began as most African territories gained independence. During this period Africans hoped that exchanges with China would result in greater aid for economic development, and hence in independence from Western capitalist countries. Paradoxically, African suspicions of China's motives also heightened, and countries such as Benin (Dahomey) and Burundi believed that the Chinese were supporting movements to overthrow their regimes.[15] African perceptions of China thus became marred by concern over imperialism and resulted in anti-Chinese sentiments. Although this portrayal of an aggressive and disruptive China was supported, if not in part initiated, by the West, the possibilities for increased relations with China remained because there was also an expansion of Sino-African cooperation in the Southern African liberation struggle. Yet fruition of these possibilities was inhibited by the skepticism expressed by some African leaders. They argued that Chinese aid was divisive because the Chinese tended to support groups not assisted by the Soviet Union. Africans contended that Sino-Soviet animosity was beginning to spill over into Africa.[16] In response African guerrillas often attempted to legitimize their Chinese aid by pointing to the Organization of African Unity and its support of competing factions

For the Chinese, this stage was characterized by diplomatic expulsions and other disappointments, by a gradual reassessment of the world situation in terms of the major "contradiction" of the Soviet Union, and by the reassessment of Chinese policy in light of African realities. This period witnessed the expulsion of Chinese ambassadors from Burundi in 1965, and from the Central African Republic, Benin, post-Nkrumah Ghana, and Tunisia in 1966. Chinese-style communist parties were banned in Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, and Tunisia. In addition, newly independent states often were headed by leaders who manifested a strong colonial legacy and as a result were generally too pro-West, too conservative, or too anti-communist to develop or expand ties with China.

Under these circumstances China sought to adjust her foreign policy by adopting an intensified differentiated approach similar to the "unity from below and unity from above" scenario. Many African leaders were strongly determined to remain "nonaligned" and viewed with caution all foreign involvement in Africa. Concern over China's potential participation in a new "scramble" for Africa was most clearly voiced by Julius Nyerere at the Moshi Conference in February 1963. During the Conference, Nyerere counseled the participants to keep internal squabbles to themselves and cautioned Africans concerning the dangers of becoming embroiled in such entanglements: "I believe the socialist countries themselves, considered as individuals in the large society of nations, are now committing the same crimes as were committed by the capitalists before. On the international level they are now beginning to use wealth for capitalistic purposes, that is for the acquisition of power and prestige.... No one of us should try to do what we so justly accuse the imperialist of doing, intrigue with dissident groups."[17]

As China became increasingly concerned over the activities of the Soviet Union in Africa, Nyerere's warning about the "second scramble for Africa" tended to attune Chinese policy to an emphasis on self-reliance as the vehicle for independence.[18] The emphasis on self-reliance eventually became the cornerstone of China's relations with African states and was constantly reiterated throughout the Chinese press and was manifested in a developing fashion in Chinese actions.[19]

In the light of these changes, China dealt with all African states at different diplomatic levels, using different techniques. China maintained close diplomatic ties with, and offered substantial economic aid to, Algeria, Tanzania, Guinea, Nkrumah's Ghana, Keita's Mali, and Nasser's Egypt. China took intermediate positions in Zambia, Uganda, Sudan, and Morocco, and either encouraged formation of communist parties or supported dissident factions in states that were too pro-West, or later pro-Soviet, and often anti-Chinese. Concomitantly, guerrilla movements were given support in Southern Africa. Economic aid for independent states was concentrated on construction of roads and railways and other projects in secondary industry, agriculture, education, and medical care. These projects were basically characterized by an emphasis on self-reliance as a means of independence and nonalliance, by interest-free loans with long periods of grace, and by the mobilization of labor rather than of intensive capital.[20]

By 1971, many of the problems that earlier had caused dislocations were being alleviated. The admission of China into the United Nations in October 1971 signaled a reappraisal by African nations, as 26 (46%) of the 76 votes for admission were African.[21] The admission heralded the beginning of the fourth stage of Sino-African relations. On the part of China, the overriding concern became the Soviet Union, which the Chinese regarded as the major contradiction or disruptive force in the world. In this sense, the Chinese cosmology that allowed for this shift and African realities converged, and it is this convergence, plus the Chinese and African understanding of it, that has determined the nature of Chinese and African interaction.

## The Essence of Chinese Foreign Policy

The pivotal issues in studies of the foreign relations of the People's Republic are familiar ones. One of the more onerous questions concerns continuities versus discontinuities. Are there not certain basic tenets or precepts characteristic of the traditional world order that, transmuted by time, have survived to manifest themselves in the guise of the thought of Mao Tse-tung?[22] Or is the opposite true—that few if any remnants of the old world perspective have survived and any reliance on such an interpretation is beset by so many misgivings that "we should be extremely skeptical of assertions that assign it great causal weight in explaining present or future Chinese policies."[23]

The question of a recrudescent "old dream"[24] or of a new ethos leads to reflection on the provincialism or cosmopolitanism of the thought of Mao. Certain scholars, though they have not ignored the Marxist-Leninist dynamics of Mao's thought, maintain that the origin of his actions lay in his "Chineseness" and that

an understanding of the historical development, culture, and exigencies of China was a prerequisite for assessing Mao's activity and therefore China's foreign policy.[25] Others claim that the iconoclasm of the New Cultural Movement, if it has not resulted in the total loss of the values that had been the foundation of the fallen imperial edifice, at least undermined their validity by thrusting China further into the orbit of Western thought and international relations. Similarly, there are those who have seen some of Mao's Chinese predispositions as being reinforced by certain strains of Western thought, and they therefore have discovered convergences "which have shaped the mental world of both Mao and his contemporaries. It may seem strange but it is not exclusively Chinese."[26]

Although examination of the Chinese environment and Western influences is unquestionably interesting, we may question what it tells us about Chinese foreign policy.[27] The world of the comparative culturalist is enlightening. It provides evidence that historical continuities do exist and that a particular cultural milieu does influence behavior. At the same time, literature demonstrates that certain aspirations, loves, and hates have transcended periodization and geography, providing an example of general human commonalities that transcend various cultural differences.[28] Thus Mao unconsciously manifested the Chang Chih-tung *t'i-yung* dichotomy by grafting a Marxist-Leninist *yung* to the Chinese *t'i*.[29] Simultaneously, it is also possible to interpret the thought of Mao in a moral-ethical-political light that is similar, if not analogous, to certain Western strains of thought and yet does not totally confute his Chinese heritage.[30] What becomes important, then, is not the existence of dichotomous tensions, but the fact that they are reconciled.

Nevertheless, much of the literature about the essence of Chinese foreign policy posits the existence of dichotomies, some scholars discovering reconciliation through the predominance of one part over the other and some seeing the resultant tensions as animating policy formation. Typical of these schisms are the following: practice/theory, ideology/power, evolutionary/revolutionary, long range/short range, nationalism/universalism, activistic/quiescent, ideology as a rationalizer/ideology as a motivating force. None of these dichotomies can be discounted as nonexistent or as lacking in didactic benefit, nor can their existence be characterized as evanescent.

Two studies provide the clearest examples of this disjunctive process. Peter Van Ness, in *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, investigated "both the theory and practice of Chinese support for wars of national liberation."[31] Although he superbly analyzed the basis of the Maoist world view in terms of the dialectics of contradiction and carried the analysis through the labyrinth of strategically despised and tactically respected enemies and vulnerable "paper tigers," Professor Van Ness concluded that survival in international affairs demanded practical action. This practical action became most evident with Lin Piao's "Long Live the Victory of the People's War" and signaled the division of revolutionary goals into "minimum and maximum."[32] What can be derived from this argument is that there was also a separation of the practical from the revolutionary and of the immediate from the distant. The tension was resolved, concludes Van Ness,

by the fact that Peking seems to have opted for the practical. Thus, China entered into what amounts to a Western-defined scheme of international affairs, for "Chinese foreign policy, like the foreign policy of many states, was first and foremost concerned with preservation and security of the state and the development of this power and prestige."[33]

In *China and Africa, 1949-1970,* Bruce Larkin posited a series of distinctions: short term/long term, domestic/foreign, substantive/expressive, evolutionary/revolutionary, and nondisruptive/disruptive.[34] Only through the use of this process of distinction, according to Larkin, could the mosaic of China's interaction with Africa be understood. Further, he concluded that although the distant goals were conscious ones, Peking's African policy was determined by the short term goals, and was therefore basically "evolutionary, substantive, non-disruptive, and intended to achieve domestic results."[35] Thus, ultimate revolutionary success, though not forgotten, became futuristic, and as a result the chances for final victory receded into the backwash of history, always beyond reach.

The works of Professors Van Ness[36] and Larkin are articulate and recondite in dealing with their respective subjects and are the best representatives of studies that portrayed the dilemmas of dichotomies reconciled through the predominance of one set over the other.[37] The perspective of these two scholars is paradoxically complemented and opposed by studies that see power, either in the Machiavellian sense or in terms of its own self-logic and dynamic, as the *raison d'être* for the thought of Mao Tse-tung and the foreign policy of the People's Republic.[38] They are complementary in that revolutionary ideology becomes tangential to the predominant interest of state power and influence in the international community, and embracing of the global positions is the basis for Chinese activity, though ideology may serve as a rationalizer, in ex post facto fashion.[39] Yet it is this rationalization that stimulates the differences between the two groups—the Van Ness and Larkin perceptions and those of the power perspective. The former acknowledged that tension existed because of the dichotomies, whereas the latter was monomaniacal, having seen ideological pronouncements as designed to serve state power interests, both domestically and internationally.[40] Still other studies hypothesize that perhaps ideology was a function of organization in a once schismatic and dysfunctional society and that the coherent, dynamic society was one in which dichotomies were reconciled.[41]

The scholarship of the Van Ness-Larkin interpretations compared with that of the power approach is almost self-evident. This is not to say that there have not been figures animated by pure power thirsts and that contemporary statesmen are not to a certain extent concerned with power. But as Benjamin Schwartz has pointed out, it is the "pure power-operator who must be regarded as the rare freak."[42] Certainly Mao was conscious of power, but it would seem almost atavistic to brush him aside as a "princely" reincarnate, not to mention the circumscribed approach to research and intellectual development that such an interpretation would require.

There is an alternative interpretation to the Van Ness-Larkin approach. Is it not possible that the reliance on dichotomous tensions has lost the ability to

inform? What has been diagnosed as separation may in fact be part of the coherent whole of the ideology of Mao. From it we might distill the essence of Chinese policy with respect to African realities. In following this line we accept, at least partially, that documentation and verbal assertions are valid expressions of conscious ideas and that these ideas may form the basis of action, though we do not discount the importance of newly emerging psychohistories or of psychological insight.[43] But as Marx pointed out, activity may not depend on the objective situation within the society, but rather on subjective perceptions. It is not the validity or falseness of an idea that is important, but rather the influence it exerts on an individual or society.[44] As Professor Frederic Wakeman has astutely remarked, "Ideologies remain vital not because they coincide with reality, but rather because those who believe in them know that while reality merely is, they would will it otherwise. That restless sense of purpose motivates all revolutionary movements; and unless we appreciate its vigor, we will never truly understand the dynamism of Chinese Communist ideology."[45]

Integration rather than separation has already been presented by Professor George Yu in his various writings on China and Africa, especially those concerned with interaction between China and Tanzania. In his monograph *China and Tanzania: —A Study in Cooperative Interaction,* Yu commented that the study of Chinese foreign policy had itself been dichotomous—one part stressing the conflictual nature and the other concentrating on cooperative patterns. He argued that to embrace one at the expense of the other was "a gross distortion of the truth" and that "a balanced account of Chinese foreign policy and behavior requires that the two interaction patterns be placed in juxtaposition."[46]

Professor John Cranmer-Byng has carried the integration theory still farther. He stressed that China's foreign policy must not be viewed through the dichotomizations of nationalism and universalism or of the pragmatic and the theoretical; to maintain that it is solely pragmatic or exclusively revolutionary is incorrect. The analyst who argues that China does or will behave in the style of a big power and therefore has come "to accept the ethos of the other major powers in international relations" must rely on "an argument derived from a Western-oriented analysis of nation-states and nationalism."[47] What is needed, Byng asserted, "is a balanced approach that does justice to the Chinese perspective and to the Chinese commitment to revolutionary change." In this fashion, China maintained a policy based on "revolutionary nationalism." The commitment to change was real and lay at the forefront of the Chinese essence, and pragmatic developments that are believed to confute this reality were indeed an integral part of the dialectic perspective. China tended to adopt a "realistic" style of diplomacy "following the generally accepted *modus vivendi* adopted by sovereign independent nation-states within the competitive world of international politics and diplomacy."[48] This practicality was the "nationalism" side of the tandem. While embracing the Western orientation, China also remained revolutionary and Chinese by simultaneously adopting an "ethical" style of diplomacy more in tune with her self-image as the "exemplar of a new society and new life style made effective in China since 1949."[49] Most important, Byng concluded that these two levels must be perceived not as alternatives but as symphoniously

merged, each an intricate and complementary part in the orchestration of Chinese foreign policy.

Unquestionably, the actions of other nations, particularly of the United States and the Soviet Union, have influenced the nature of Chinese foreign policy. But the actions themselves do not intrinsically provide insight into the essence of Chinese foreign policy.[50] The Maoist view of the world does not accept a tranquil, harmonious cosmos. Mao posits that change occurs through the integration of contradictions and will.[51] Further, although Mao's analysis may seem to be a dreamlike perception of man's existence and development,[52] it is also characterized by pragmatic responses to determined contradictions. It is this merging of the analytical with the practical, exposed through the postulates in Mao's writings, that must be seen as the essence of Chinese foreign policy. Dicho- tomies are less significant in this approach because what has been termed the pragmatic-evolutionary side becomes part of the essence itself. Thus, what appears to contradict Maoist revolutionary theory, leading some scholars to opt for perceptions of China as behaving contrarily and in tune with nationstatism, is not really incongruency but rather part of the essence of Mao Tse-tung's thought that allows for practical shifts in apparent contradiction to revolutionary statements.

Mao Tse-tung apposed knowledge and practice and theory and practice. In his essay, "On Practice," he states that "to achieve the anticipated results" man must bring his theory "into correspondence with the laws of the objective world; if they do not correspond, he will fail in his practice."[53] Moreover, Mao maintained that dialectical materialism emphasizes practice, stressing that "human knowledge can in no way be separated from practice and repudiating all the erroneous theories which deny the importance of practice or separate knowledge from practice."[54] For Mao, theory was derived from testing, and once formulated it must return to practice, for revolutionary change can only emerge from functional knowledge.[55] There is no theory/practice dichotomization for Mao and to maintain so is to create a perception inimical to the Chairman's and to deny his recurrent thesis: "Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level."[56]

With the correlation of theory to practice, the question becomes: What is the knowledge that forms the basis of the Maoist perception of the world? Mao was acutely aware of the frequent disparity between subjective ideals and objective reality.[57] This divergence—"the material determines the mental and social being determines social consciousness"[58]—is not antithetical to materialism but rather, according to Mao, "avoids mechanical materialism and firmly upholds dialectical materialism."[59] What binds the subjective and the objective in positive interaction and conscious conjunction for Mao is the universality of contradiction: "There is nothing that does not contain contradiction; without contradiction nothing would exist."[60]

The Maoist conception of polarities is not simplistic,[61] for it involves the "universality of contradiction, the particularity of contradiction, the principal contradiction and the principal aspect of a contradiction, the identity and the

struggle of the aspects of a contradiction, and the place of antagonism in contradiction."[62] Despite its complexity, the essence of Mao's thought and of China's foreign policy resides in the Maoist perception of antagonisms resolved through the functional correlation of theory and practice and the unity and struggle of opposites which transform into one another.[63] For Mao holds that the dialectical world outlook "teaches us primarily how to observe and analyze the movement of opposites in different things, and on the basis of such analysis, to indicate the methods for resolving contradictions."[64]

Mao's integration of theory and practice allowed for a large variety of tactical choices to achieve a reconciliation of opposites.[65] Similarly, the theory of contradictions was fluid, permitting a wide range of choices both for action and for definition of the polarity because Mao perceived separate yet integrated sets of contradictions—the principal and its particular counterparts.[66] Although contentions are universal, it is "precisely in the particularity of contradiction that the universality of contradiction resides."[67] This enables Mao to state that the world is not colorless but mosaic, since the "particular contradiction constitutes the particular essence which distinguishes one thing from another. It is the internal cause, or as it may be called, the basis for the immense variety of things in the world.... Every form of society, every form of ideology, has its own particular contradiction and particular essence."[68] This concept of the principal and the particular allows for a varietal analysis determined by the peculiarities of each situation and each society,[69] which Mao fuses with a fluidity of responses to these differences: "The principle of using different methods to resolve different contradictions is one which Marxist-Leninists must strictly observe...; different methods should be used to resolve different contradictions."[70]

## The African Perspective

African fascination with Mao and China has developed with a skepticism about China's motives on the African continent. Both fact and fiction have contributed to this wariness.[71] Part of it lay in the fact that Africans had struggled against colonial rule and had no intention of substituting one form of subservience for another. Africans were sensitive to their historical experience with Europeans, who ostensibly assisted them against traditional rivals in the nineteenth century, only to find themselves colonized by their supposed European ally. In attempts to avoid similar mistakes, Africans have sought to develop foreign policies directed toward nonalignment.[72] These policies often were rooted in nationalistic sentiments and in the legacy of Western colonialism. Nationalism became a positive force in the drive for self-determination,[73] while the colonial legacy tended to retain much of its old framework and led to the possible development of neocolonialism.[74]

> That many leaders of the new African states find themselves in a perplexing position, there is no doubt. They are strongly dependent on foreign contributions simply to maintain the machinery of their governments. Many of them have deliberately been made so weak economically, by being carved up into many separate countries, that they are not able to sustain out of their own resources the machinery of independent government, the cost of which cannot be reduced beyond a certain minimum. I

> recognize the impossible position in which they were placed when the transfer of power took place. Their frontiers were not of their own choosing, and they were left with an economic, administrative, and educational system which, each in its own way, was designed to perpetuate the colonial relationship. Ghana's case was no different, but we are making decisive efforts to change the pattern and are determined to retain our independence of policy and action.[75]

Foreign policy reflected the continual tension between nationalism and the colonial legacy and was largely conceptualized as a product of that struggle. African foreign policies toward China also reflected this tension. African nationalism and the Western colonial legacy qualified the opportunities for Sino-African relations, sharply defining possible areas of successful interaction. Consequently, the four phases in Sino-African relations must also be attributed in part to African initiatives and African dynamics.

As Mao and the Chinese Communist Party were culminating a successful revolution, Africa was swept with a nationalist fervor that demanded independence. It was manifested in variations in the colonial institutional framework and in the different means used to achieve independence. In many areas where colonialism sought to create Black Europeans, African nationalism developed a strong cultural component called "Negritude."[76] In the colonies where cultural assimilation was not a specific administrative policy, African nationalism had a distinctly political flavor, best expressed by Ghana's first President, Kwame Nkrumah, whose maxim was, "Seek ye first the political kingdom." In Black Africa nationalism produced several mass movements that rid their countries of their European colonizers.[77] However, few African nationalists were forced into violent confrontations with the West, since most of them negotiated with the colonizers for political independence. In other countries mass nationalism was never required because the colonizers anticipated the "winds of change" and rapidly began to relinquish political control.[78] By contrast, guerrilla war in Southern Africa has remained an essential part of the Africans' struggle because of the continued tenacity of colonial subjugation in some territories.

Despite the variety of tactics and strategies employed by the independence movements, some characteristics have transcended political particularisms or provincialisms and have helped to define African nationalism.[79] These commonalities are crucial, for they have been fundamental to the determination of foreign policy by Africans. First, the territorial boundaries set by the colonial powers, together with the political and economic structures established therein, provided the physical and institutional framework that gave rise to nationalism. In this context African nationalism was the antithesis of colonialism. Second, the emergence of this nationalism as a viable movement was the result of anxiety over, and/or hatred of, an external force that then consolidated as an emotional drive against colonialism and foreign domination. Third, African solidarity created by nationalism was simultaneously a positive and a negative force. Nationalism called for the eviction of colonialism, while also expressing an affirmation of freedom and self-determination.[80] Fourth, nationalism in Africa was characterized by a restoration of indigenous perspectives, cultural traditions, and the establishment of a pride in a common past as defined by the

nationalist.[81] Finally, African nationalism constituted the initial basis for independence, which in turn provided an environment in which modernization and Africanization could evolve in a unified, indigenous manner.[82]

These characteristics of African nationalism provided the impetus for nonaligned foreign policies, since inherent in this nationalism was anti-imperialism. As newly independent states, African countries sought to remain aloof from "big power" contention and from reliance on "super powers" or former colonial rulers. Nationalism further expressed nonalignment sentiments by continuing cultural determinants that attempted to limit the impact of non-African concepts. Indicative of this effort was Negritude, which African nationalists espoused in territories where Europeans had assimilated Africans at the expense of indigenous personalities and cultures. In these instances, Africans were preoccupied with reestablishing an indigenous perspective that had reality in their daily lives. Although this circumstance theoretically contributed to nonalignment, it gave rise more immediately to a cultural renaissance that stimulated a new and dynamic African literature, music, and art. The result of this rebirth was the development of an internal rather than an external focus, and consequently these countries placed less emphasis on a nonaligned foreign policy and retained many of the old colonial ties. These Africans never defined their colonial subjugation as political domination[83]—as was demonstrated most clearly by the former French colonies of Senegal and Ivory Coast.[84] Thus, these nations' attempts to formalize and expand contacts with China have been inhibited by their contacts with Western Europe.

Other features of the colonial legacy were also important in shaping African foreign policies. Perhaps education, the nature of the colonial environment, and economic ties were the most salient of these features. Western education, which tended to mold Africans in the liberal tradition, produced few revolutionaries.[85] African politics often were dominated by bourgeois reformists who repeatedly attempted to bring about changes by working within the colonial system.[86] After independence they retained close ties to the old metropolitan power structure.[87] Such relationships influenced their image of the world, and thereby intensified suspicions of Chinese motives in Africa.

Aspects of the colonial environment also reinforced the pro-Western bias.[88] In most British colonies the old colonial regime attempted to guide the direction of "political freedom" for Africans by creating parlimentary democracies with expatriot experts in the civil and technical services. Once set in motion, these institutions clearly helped shape post-independence African politics,[89] which in turn tended to predispose Africans toward interaction with the West and limited contact with China.

Finally, economic ties with the West have served to inhibit interaction with the non-Western world, especially China. These economic connections have been most visible in Francophone Africa, and in particular the Ivory Coast. Former British colonies such as Kenya and Gambia also have been closely tied with the West. Much of their economic framework developed under colonial rule, and after independence was buttressed by Western aid programs.[90] When African countries attempted to limit their reliance on the West by trying to balance

their Western connections with expanded relations with Eastern bloc nations and China, they suffered economic reprisals.[91]

Another part of the colonial legacy and a characteristic of African nationalist movements was their reliance on one central figure.[92] The dominance by a single personality had important ramifications for the articulation and implementation of foreign policy. In some instances the nationalist leader was able to chart a more independent path because of charisma, a mass following, international stature, or the relative unimportance of his country in world affairs. Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, and Sékou Touré were good illustrations. Others, such as Patrice Lumumba, were not so fortunate.[93]

Julius Nyerere best exemplified the impact of a strong personality on Sino-African relations. His dedication to nonalignment and African socialism has predisposed him to favor an independent course for Tanzania,[94] and he has accepted only those Western aid programs that fit within Tanzania's framework for development. As a result, his African socialism has cost him Western capital investment, and there have been efforts to discredit and hamstring his economic policies.[95] In attempts to overcome these pressures, Nyerere has tried to institute an ideology of self-help and to create an indigenous perspective on socialism. By looking inward he has worked to construct an economic infrastructure focused on community agriculture from which particular industrial programs might develop. These programs contained a political dynamic that sought to define an African historical legitimacy and social structure in order to create "African" socialism.

Because of his nationalistic proclivities and his stress on indigenous development, foreign support for Nyerere's programs has been limited. China, Nyerere believed, offered an alternative because he perceived similarities between China and Tanzania. This was clearly evident when in 1965 on a state visit to China he concluded, "If it were possible for me to lift all the ten million Tanzanians and bring them to China to see what you have done since the liberation, I would do so."[96] Subsequently, Chinese assistance enhanced Nyerere's development programs and reinforced his assertions that China's aid best fits the Tanzanian socioeconomic environment.[97] The Tanzania-Zambia Railroad seemed to offer proof of these assertions, especially since the project carried no "special" conditions. China's willingness to meet Tanzanian self-help and nationalistic criteria combined with Nyerere's efforts to limit the effects of the colonial legacy on Tanzania, thereby producing a fertile relationship between the two nations.[98]

> From no quarter shall we accept direction, or neo-colonialism, and at no time shall we lower our guard against the subversion of our government or our people. Neither our principles, our country, nor our freedom to determine our own future are for sale.[99]

In other African countries foreign policy formulation and implementation were subject to similar pressures and constraints. Since the variables—nationalism and the colonial legacy—were continental, the general perspective and the rhetorical promotion of nonalignment continued. The degree to which an African country practiced nonalignment tended to be a function of its colonial legacy,[100] and the determination of such a legacy and its impact on policy formation remains a difficult task.[101] For our purposes, clarification of the African attitudes

and the perspective derived from a common historical experience help to determine what in most cases was an acceptable posture from which a foreign nation could approach Africa and to evaluate how Africans have assessed their own interests. Further, to ascertain the specific reaction of each African country to foreign overtures or to analyze African interests, it is necessary to measure the significance of each variable.

Some critics might argue that post-independence Africa has assumed a new stance now that many African nations are no longer headed by the nationalist who led the nation to independence. Military coups have been common. Some leaders have created one-party states that have become virtual dictatorships, and most African countries have constrained opposition and dissent.

The impetus for change in all cases resulted to a large extent from the colonial legacy and the subsequent development of neocolonialism.[102] This is not to exempt Africans from blame, or to exclude them from praise, or to make them into faceless actors in a fatalistic world. Instability, absence of a legitimate institutional infrastructure, and scarcity of opportunities and resources were present in all ex-colonies. The degree to which these factors were present and the influence they exerted, both individually and generally, helps to explain each coup and the resultant "new" African politics.

For instance, in Zaire (formerly Congo-Kinshasa) the struggle for independence apparently had ended rapidly, with Patrice Lumumba taking power from Belgium as a result of the 1959-1960 negotiations. [103] Just two years earlier he had begun to organize the territory's first "national" political party—an almost impossible task in such a short time because communications were not well developed in the immense colony. Yet despite this difficulty, the Congo in 1960 negotiated independence under Lumumba's leadership.

The essence of Lumumba's political thought and the role of his political movement were indicative of the African nationalism that was sweeping the continent.[104] Lumumba sought United Nations assistance precisely because of his commitment to nonalignment. When this organization proved incapable of separating its position from Western interests, Lumumba pressed for active involvement by the Soviet Union in an attempt to guarantee his independence.[105] His failure and subsequent fall from power reflected in part the strength of the colonial legacy in the former Belgian Congo and underlined his party's inability to mobilize a nationalistic fervor sufficiently powerful to counteract the evolving neocolonialism.

His successors, though they achieved power in post-independence politics, faced the same struggle between nationalism and the colonial legacy. They formulated policy from perceptions shaped primarily by the interplay of those two variables. President Mobutu Sese Seko was successful by using the neocolonial setting to gain power. His presidency was the product of overt Western intervention and American CIA clandestine activities and led to a strong pro-West foreign policy.[106] However, as the geopolitical situation in Africa changed with the battle for Angola's independence, Mobutu's neocolonial ties were loosened, and he was able to pursue a more independent course in international politics. To consolidate his own domestic power and to legitimize his nationalist leader-

ship, Mobutu made attempts to build Zairian nationalism.[107] In foreign policy this meant legitimization through efforts at nonalignment, and he therefore visited China in 1973 and negotiated a Chinese aid program that brought a few hundred technical advisors to Zaire.[108]

Still, the colonial legacy remained important for the politics of Zaire. Western multinational corporations have expanded their holdings, and Western aid programs are omnipresent.[109] The colonial legacy in Zaire helped create a neocolonial system fed by instability and by Western capital investments. Yet simultaneously this legacy weakened as the anti-imperial fervor intensified with neighboring Angola's liberation. From these complexities the basis of Zaire's foreign policy evolved, reflecting the continued tension between African nationalism and the colonial legacy.

Other coups in Africa such as those in Togo, Benin, and Ghana exemplified the same characteristics for foreign policy decisions.[110] Where the colonial legacy had dissipated, nonalignment remained the policy and goal. No African country that has limited (without cutting) it ties with the West has become a close ally either of Russia and the Eastern bloc, or of China. Instead, African nationalism has rekindled a more parochial spirit identified with the individual African territory rather than with the pan-African nature from which it originally sprang.[111] Local interests have become increasingly important and have displaced important continental or regional issues.[112]

The struggle against settler colonialism in Southern Africa has remained the single unifying force that has transcended this parochialism and has given continued substance to a greater African nationalism. This is not surprising in light of the anticolonial, antiracism, and self-determination characteristics of the struggle. Comprehension of, and sensitivity to, the foreign policy of African states requires an appreciation of the pan-African attitudes, the dimensions of African nationalism, and the guest for nonalignment that the struggle in Southern Africa conjures up for each African nation: "Colonialism must be wiped out in Africa before any post-colonial independent state can feel secure."[113] This renewed nationalist fervor offers further insight into African policy formulation by suggesting a focus on the differentiation and orientation of issues.[114]

In Southern Africa colonial rule continues. Within the context of settler colonialism, the world is faced with internal settler regimes, African guerrilla armies, African liberation movements, moderate African reformists, and possible internal reform governments involving coalitions between African elites and white settlers.[115] Each group actively promotes a foreign policy, and so long as instability continues, each group must be taken into account by foreign governments if they are to appreciate the political dynamics of the region. For Black African societies and liberation movements, support in the struggle to end this last vestige of foreign domination on the African continent is of paramount importance. To this end, aid has been requested from a variety of sources, for as one Zimbabwean nationalist has stated, "Communist help has been accepted .... to effect the liberation of the African continent from the shackles and fetters of colonialism. Help has also been accepted from the capitalist countries for the same reason. [Yet] it is clear that African nationalists do not accept Western or Eastern help so that they can become capitalists or communists."[116]

For both liberation groups and independent African governments, this continuing struggle in Southern Africa has served as an impetus for overtures to and by non-Western countries.[117] African countries have used the Southern African issue as a fulcrum to gain leverage against Western influence. They have expanded their non-Western contacts—many made initially because of the struggle in Southern Africa—to other political and economic issues of mutual interest. The development of these ties and the reaffirmation of nonalignment is illustrated by the growth of Sino-African relations.[118]

Clearly, nonalignment is of fundamental importance to the African states. However, it is also a luxury that states such as the Ivory Coast do not feel they can yet afford. To these countries the pursuit of such a course could mean disruption and instability for those in power and for the nation as a whole. Where the old ties have remained strong, the expansion of the colonial legacy is easy to discern.[119]

The nationalism that developed within this context promoted an individual African identity and not a radical change in the socioeconomic power relationship with the metropolitan country. In such states nonalignment was more the rhetoric of nationalism than a functional reality. In other countries, the struggle for nonalignment was on a daily basis. In Tanzania and Guinea (Conakry), for example, foreign policy was a manifestation of an African nationalism that continued to fight against neocolonialism and for political and economic independence.[120] Their success was both helped and hindered by their continued poverty. The stability and forcefulness of their leadership has in part countered the colonial legacy. Within this framework, they insisted that their African perspective remain an integral part of any foreign activity within their territory. Moreover, they rejected aid that did not meet this criterion, while in foreign policy they demanded that no country constrain African relations with another nation.

Most African states represent a middle ground between Ivory Coast and Tanzania. As we have postulated, foreign policy formulation for Africans was essentially a function of the tension between African nationalism and the colonial legacy. Although African nations have given rhetorical support to nonalignment, they have often been unable to attain its realization. The colonial situation remaining in Southern Africa has served both as a reminder and as an impetus for African states to push for an independent course. What Africans view as a crisis situation has been exacerbated by the continued complicity of Western nations in Southern Africa and by the West's failure to support African efforts to resolve the conflict.[121] Paradoxically, this situation also permitted both the liberation movements and the independent Black African states to take initiatives that have promoted nonalignment at the expense of Western interests. Therefore, to the degree that countries such as Mao's China met African needs without attaching compromising conditions, they were welcomed to initiate, accept, and expand foreign relations with African states.

## The Chinese World Perspective and African Realities

Southern Africa has been a focal point in the struggle against colonialism and racism during the past two decades. This has been a region in which skin color and ethnic heritage have determined rights and status. Racial and ethnic distinctions have led to the doctrine of racial and cultural differentiation as the basis for social order, and it has been this order that the African liberation movements have sought to destroy. Chinese interaction with Southern Africa has centered on the ability of China's perceptions of the world to complement or coincide with the African demands for liberation from racial and economic domination.

As we have noted, Mao's view of the world, and thus much of Chinese foreign policy during his life, centered on three basic ideas: the theory of changing contradictions and their reconciliation through theory and practice; the concept of self-reliance; and the belief that revolutionary progress can come only from "the establishment of a lasting peace" which "is inseparable from the national independence movements. Only when the people of all countries have gained independence and equality can a stable and lasting peace come into being. This is the good for which our nations in Asia and Africa should jointly fight."[122] In 1955 the Bandung Conference seemed to establish an understanding which indicated that Chinese perceptions and African demands for liberation had converged. The Conference stressed the need to battle against racism and imperialism and to stress nonalignment—basic tenets that brought African aspirations and Chinese perceptions into line. The Conference seemed to portend a fruitful relationship based on similar concerns and on a concerted effort to rectify problems considered paramount by both sides.

Formal ties between China and Egypt facilitated the commitment to support African liberation and provided a meeting place for African nationalists and the Chinese where they could develop a mutual understanding and learn from one another. This connection was crucial because, as mentioned earlier, Cairo was a center for all liberation movements and political exiles in Africa. The relationship was facilitated by the fact that from 1955 to 1965 the Chinese identified four "fundamental contradictions"—those between the socialist and imperialist camps, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in capitalist countries, between the oppressed nations and imperialism, and among the imperialist countries themselves.[123] This was basically an identification that allowed for nonalignment and hence for a position that met African desires for active anti-imperialism and noninterference in African internal affairs.

Before 1965 the Chinese had not identified a principal "contradiction," though they noted that Africa, Asia, and Latin America were the "most vulnerable areas under imperialist rule and the storm-center of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism."[124] To Africans the theme of anti-imperialism and independence was desirable, but about 1965 the relationships of the Chinese with African nations became more complex and underwent at least partial change. The reason for this change was mainly the strong emphasis by Africans on nonalignment—defined as independence from direct and indirect control by outside nations.[125] For African leaders this commitment translated into a position that demanded an avoidance of "big-power" contention and a

strong reaction against interference in the domestic politics of independent African states. If an African leader was to receive assistance from non-African nations, the nature of the aid and its source were to be determined by the recipient.

While Africans continued to expostulate against unsolicited interference, China, by the end of 1965, had identified the principal contradiction to be the United States and the major battle ground for the reconciliation of this contradiction to be Africa, Asia, and Latin America.[126] At this point, African realities and Chinese perceptions diverged, and in many instances the Chinese began to suffer the aforementioned diplomatic problems. As the identification of the principal contradiction became clear, the tactics necessary to reconcile it also changed in accordance with Mao's view of a dynamically changing world. Therefore, the Chinese now demanded what was viewed as alignment against the United States—a position inimical to some African leaders who claimed the right to select the countries with which they would interact. Further, Africans tended to resent Chinese involvement in "domestic" revolutions that the Chinese viewed as part of the struggle with bourgeois, capitalistic United States. The result of Chinese participation, no matter how minimal, was the dissolution or cooling off of relationships with most African nations.[127]

By 1969 China had begun to identify U.S.-Soviet hegemonism as the principal disparity in the world[128] and thus this change in identification, when tested, gave rise to a new theory of reconciliation that again seemed to fit the realities of Africa, especially in Southern Africa.[129] Nonalignment became the center of China's policy, as the resolution of the principal disparity was "rising like the sweeping wind and the waving cloud." As Mao had frequently noted, the principal contradiction often shifted, and its reconciliation was necessarily fluid also. Different responses were required for individual situations and exigencies, and therefore when U.S.-Soviet hegemonism, and eventually Soviet "social imperialism," were identified as the principal disruptive forces, Peking's response took on differing but still rational and ideologically consistent forms.[130]

The response to this situation was to stress the policy of nonalignment—the idea that for a nation to be truly independent it must not align itself either with the Soviet Union or with the United States, because to do so would only subordinate that nation's true autonomy.[131] In this sense the Chinese seemed to have learned from their earlier experience when the call for resistance to the United States ultimately came to mean active alignment against that principal contradiction. This posture had proved disruptive to relations with African states and had resulted in diplomatic expulsions. The stress on a functional nonalignment permitted the Chinese to remain true to Mao's world view and to avoid conflict with African nationalism and reality. This policy had been articulated constantly by many African and South-east Asian leaders,[132] and was maintained by nationalists such as Tanzanian President Nyerere who empathized with Peking.[133] With their new analysis of Soviet "social imperialism," the Chinese did not create many new obstacles to relations with African states. Although African nations remained closely linked to the West and the United States, they were never accountable to the Russians. African relations with the Soviets were

designed to strengthen the Africans' nonalignment policies, not to destroy them. Thus, few of the African countries maintained close contacts with the Soviet Union.[134] For Africans, the Chinese anti-Soviet position, especially if it avoided subversive actions within Africa, was not a fundamental priority, for they had long lived with the West's active anti-Russian dogma.

Part of the African sense of nationalism has been the concern that foreign assistance would lead to procrustean attempts by the donor to shape the nation's economy and/or political structure.[135] In this sense the Chinese proclivity for "self-reliance" has generally matched African realities. The Chinese asserted: "We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign aid but cannot be dependent on it; we depend on our own efforts, on the creative power of the whole army and the entire people."[136] As a result, Chinese aid to African nations generally has been welcomed because it does not carry the usual requirements attached to assistance from other donors.[137]

Although Chinese assistance has been relatively modest—$3384 million through 1973—there was one substantial program. China gave about $400 million in an interest-free loan, to be paid over a thirty-year period, for the construction of the Tan-Zam Railway. The consequences of this project for Southern Africa were manifold, especially considering that overtures to other possible donors by Tanzania and Zambia were habitually ridiculed. First, the railroad stimulated fear among the colonial powers. This in turn led to expanded pro-imperialist support under the guise of anti-communism and to an increase in the colonialist's chances for aid from the West against communist "terrorists." Second, Zambia was potentially freed from transportation and economic ties with the white South. The possibility of secure guerrilla bases and staging areas in Zambia became realistic if the railroad lessened Zambia's dependence on the settler regimes. Third, the construction potentially strengthened Tanzanian politics and economics at the expense of the white South, and again, offered secure staging areas for guerrillas. Fourth, the railway facilitated Tanzania and Zambia's nonalignment. Finally, the Chinese technicians lived the indigenous life styles of the host countries and thus reinforced the Africans' pride in their culture.

The railway's potential for success was great because it was based on African needs and desires and because it supported African self-perceptions. It was designed to strengthen the independence of the two countries by reducing their dependence on colonial states, while at the same time recognizing the concern of African states that outside aid might lead to external interference in internal affairs. Further, the project promoted self-reliance and helped to provide a mechanism by which independent development could take place according to indigenously defined needs.

Despite the initial euphoria over the successful construction of the railroad, its practical effectiveness was diminished as the political development of African states changed the relationships among nations and therefore the realities that influenced the relationship between Africa and China. The flexibility of China's policy again was tested by Southern Africa's rapid changes, both violent and peaceful. In this sense the coup in Portugal contributed to the reconstruction of

the geopolitics of the Southern African subcontinent. The victory by the MPLA in Angola might allow Zambia to ship goods on the Benguela Railway and thus eliminate the political necessity of the relationship with Tanzania. Moreover, the MPLA's victory changed the relationship between China and Angola. China recognized the necessity of removing itself from its limited support of UNITA and FNLA, especially when South Africa began to support these two movements.[138] Also China's dedication to self-reliance dictated that the liberation movements contend among themselves for the right to be the legitimate government of Angola. The realities of the African situation and the Chinese perception of self-reliance permitted China to extricate itself from a potential quagmire and thus to detach itself from a situation in which Western nations supported UNITA and FNLA. In addition, the Chinese identification of the Soviet Union as the principal contradiction in Africa seemed to have the ring of truth as the Russians and Cubans began to appear to behave as imperialists on the African continent.[139] Thus, African complexities fused with Chinese analytical flexibility, and the Chinese continued to be viewed primarily as an anti-imperialist ally.

The situation in Mozambique further demonstrated both the complexity of African liberation and China's concern for self-reliance, with its emphasis on resolving the contradiction through nonalignment. In Mozambique independence came from the liberation movement, FRELIMO, which was aided by both China and the Soviet Union. Apparently, the impetus for this rare joint support arose from the determination of the Chinese not to see the new government bound to the "social imperialism" of the Soviet Union and from the fact that close interaction between Tanzania and FRELIMO facilitated the "cooperation." China expressed an awareness of the strong nationalist sentiments that characterized many African nations and believed that these sentiments were compatible with its concern that the "new czars" might dominate the newly independent nation. Chinese world perceptions and FRELIMO realities tended to reinforce each other, and China has heeded the message of FRELIMO's first president, Dr. Eduardo Mondlane:

> What are we supposed to do if, apart from the Africans, only the communists will train and arm us. It was apparently alright for the West to ally itself with the communists against the fascists, but when we are denied Western aid we are apparently expected to do without communist aid as well.... As for the suggestion that we are teleguided by Moscow and Peking because we accept their aid, the answer is that those who know FRELIMO know that this is simply not true. Let the West offer to help us, and then they can test whether or not we are truly non-aligned.[140]

China demonstrated respect for the integrity of the new national, and as a result Mozambique continued to expand its ties with Mao's China after independence.

China's concern over Soviet activity further accorded with African perceptions as China provided training in Mozambique for the guerrillas of the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) who fought for liberation in Zimbabwe.[141] China also has given to talented African students scholarships that have provided further training in China.[142]

Chinese support of liberation movements that fought for an independent

Zimbabwe was a delicate procedure. Many African states voiced concern that China should not be a divisive influence, backing forces simply because of a concern over Soviet designs. Some Africans argued that such a position would be retrogressive and factional and therefore would be helpful to "imperialist" designs in Africa. These Africans contended that the correct procedure for both the Russians and the Chinese was to funnel aid through the Organization of African Unity's Committee on Liberation. The situation became more sensitive because of the internal disputes that gave rise to such movements as the Patriotic Front.

In the light of Africa's protean environment, China has consistently emphasized self-reliance and nonalignment as a means of meeting African demands while still meeting the challenge of the "major contradiction."[143] Their assistance to the liberation forces, apart from training programs, has been primarily in the form of small weapons, medical aid, food, and some technical assistance. Large modern weaponry such as airplanes and rockets has not been supplied, since China has stressed independent liberation and the development of an indigenous politico-military infrastructure. In South Africa and Namibia the same has held true; there has been only a small-scale aid program concerned with student scholarships to China.[144]

Although the focus of China's activities in Africa centered on Southern Africa in the early 1970s, China was also regaining its credibility with several other African states. The result was a reemergence of interest in contacts with China. This renewal emanated from more than changing-African perceptions and enhanced credibility. There is no doubt that the Tan-Zam Railroad, its ramifications and its impact, lessened Africans' wariness of Chinese motives. Yet perhaps the greatest impetus for renewed Sino-African relations arose from internal changes in the African countries and changes in their individual positions in international politics. The continued struggle in Southern Africa and a belief in the multipolarity of world politics inhibited neocolonial gains in states such as Nigeria, Tanzania, and Mozambique, with a consequent reassertion of nonalignment and Afro-Asian solidarity.[145] Africans also used Sino-American relations to legitimize their more independent stance in world politics and thus to alleviate the pressure of their colonial legacy. The result has been a continual flow of African leaders to Peking to request additional aid. In this way Africans hoped to strengthen their political and economic positions and to guarantee a nonaligned foreign policy for the future— developments that reflect the continuity of nationalism in Africa and its role in policy development.

## Conclusion

It is essential that the analyst of Chinese-African interaction understand the world view held by Mao Tse-tung and the aspirations of Africans and the realities of Africa. Analysis must be firmly grounded in recognition of the depth of African nationalism and in a sensitivity to the historical forces of imperialism and racism.

Peking has not manifested strident contradictions when the totality of its

world perspective is analyzed and placed in the context of the idea of a principal contradiction, local contradictions, and the stress on self-reliance. The explanation of China's behavior in Africa is not nationalism, nor Kissinger quinarianism, nor state power. Up to 1976, it was the internal logic of the Maoist view that allowed for pragmatic and differing responses to individual situations and exigencies; the response was determined by practical knowledge fused with particular contradictions. China did not prescribe a single "Chinese" prophylaxis to be taken by all nations seeking liberation.[146] China advocated that liberation and independence should be achieved through the development of solutions characteristic of the locality and true to self-reliance and an avoidance of "patterned" or "patented" solutions. Thus, nonalignment, independence, and self-help evolved as the major tenets of Chinese policy.

Africa is a large and complex continent that has its own dynamics, a feature most noticeable among liberation movements in Southern Africa. Only when the Chinese identification of contradictions and the "practical" analysis of how to overcome them coincided with the complexities of the African situation did Chinese and African interaction become complementary, based on mutual understandings and interests.

The shift in the Chinese analysis that precipitated a reassessment of the nature of Sino-African interaction was closer to the demands of African nationalism, nonalignment, and anti-imperialism. Chinese assistance to Tanzania and Zambia in the construction of the Tan-Zam Railway provided the necessary credibility for the Chinese in their assertion that China supported those African principles. Moreover, China often was viewed as a model that might have certain applicability for Africa. This model was not to be mindlessly emulated—both Peking and the African states acknowledged this. Indeed, the Chinese advocated and the Africans demanded that any application of the model should respect and be modified by indigenous alterations that reflected local perspectives and local problems: "Self reliance in building socialism also means that we must gain knowledge of the laws of socialist construction through our own efforts instead of copying the experience of other nations."[147]

On the African side, China had given the liberation movements essential bargaining power with the Soviet Union and the United States, providing a viable alternative to what many Africans considered imperialist hegemony. This perception frequently was manifested by statements concerning Chinese aid and its "neutrality." One source concluded that Chinese assistance was "discrete, effective, and practical with concentration on projects much appreciated by the rural population."[148] More ebullient was the conclusion of Mali's Moussa Tsaore that "China's disinterested assistance . . . is all the more appreciated because we are in a world dominated by the egoism and hegemonic desire of the imperialist big powers.... I wish to [thank] the Chinese people for this co-operation which is suited to our convenience. . . ." [149]

Some difficulties continued to surface between the African states and China. For example, there was concern over China's preoccupation with, and analysis of, the Soviet threat and the potential disunity that this might cause among African states and liberation movements. Nonetheless, the Chinese have generally compensated for the imbalance with genuine political empathy and leadership against imperialism in the United Nations.[150]

In turn, Africans supported China's entrance into the United Nations and provided a series of revolutions, either social or political, that in part reflected the Chinese model. They noted that China's place in the United Nations might lessen Africa's dependence on the West. Moussa Tsaore emphasized this point: "The presence of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations as a permanent member of the Security Council [may] contribute notably to the strengthening of the capacity of this organization in maintaining peace and international security... [and] at the same time it [may] constitute a guarantee for the small countries, which are often victims of direct imperialism."[151] Africans also offered China an end to isolation and respect as a potential world power and as a "leader" in the "liberation" struggles of the Third World. Thus, when African realities and Chinese analysis of the major contradiction became confluent, Sino-African interaction provided a revolutionary development in the concept of equality of relations "among most unequal equals."

## *NOTES*

1. Winberg, Chai, comp., *The Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China* (New York, 1972). Dr. Chai stresses multi-determination, including such factors as tradition, the international environment, and political culture.

2. For a well developed perspective on how the African environment is of primary importance for determining the nature of Soviet-African relations, see Colin Legum, "The USSR and Africa: The African Environment," *Problems of Communism* (Jan-Feb/1978), pp. 1-19. See also: George Yu, *China's Africa Policy: A Study of Tanzania* (New York, 1975); Crawford Pratt, *The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945-1968* (London, 1976); Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise of Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Boston, 1960); and Colin Legum, *Pan Africanism* (London, 1962).

3. Examples are Bruce Larkin, *China and Africa, 1949-1970* (Berkeley, 1971); Alaba Ogunsanwo, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958-1971* (London, 1974); Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Africa and the Communist World* (Stanford, 1963); Fritz Schatten, *Communism in Africa* (New York, 1966); James Mayall, *Africa: The Cold War and After* (London, 1971).

4. For a discussion of this point, see Alan Hutchison, *China's African Revolution* (London, 1975), p. 106.

5. An example of such an image is provided by Seymour Freidin, who editorialized in the *New York Times* that: "The Red Chinese drive in Africa ... involves a long range effort to dominate the continent totally and populate it with Chinese." See Hutchison, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

6. For example, see Jay Howard Ginsburg, *China: Rationalizing the Demonic: Approaches to the Chinese Communist World View* (New York, 1972).

7. Wolfgang Bartke, *China's Economic Aid* (London, 1975), pp. 9-10. Prime Minister Lansana Beavogui of Guinea-Conakry commented during a state visit to China: "This iden-

tity of the colonial and semi-colonial past, this identity of aspirations for happiness and of common objectives have, despite the distances that geographically separate China and Guinea, made the two peoples close, intimately close to each other." ("Prime Minister Lansana Beavogui of Guinea Visits China," *Peking Review* (December 15, 1972), p. 5.) See also "Press Communique on President Mobutu's Visit to China," *Peking Review* (January 26, 1973), p. 8.

8. Bartke, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

9. See Chou En-lai's "Interview with Reporters of the Ghana News Agency," *Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism* (Peking, 1964), pp. 146-150.

10. Hutchison, *op. cit.*, p. 205; Bartke, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-12; James C. Hsiung, "Context in Chinese Foreign Policy," *Problems in Communism* (Jan-Feb/1978), pp. 59-63.

11. *NCNA*, Bamako, (January 16, 1964).

12. Quoted in Brian Jeffries, "China Wins African Friends," *Santa Barbara News Press*, (April 17, 1977).

13. For a discussion of the details, see Larkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-19, and Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, 1970), pp. 12-13.

14. Hutchison, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

15. Larkin, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

16. Hutchison, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-237.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

18. Mao had stressed self-reliance as early as 1945 when he wrote, "We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign aid but cannot be dependent on it; we depend on our own efforts, on the creative power . . . of the entire people." Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* 2 (Peking, 1965), p. 219.

19. For instance see Tseng Yun, "Now China Carries Out the Policy of Self-Reliance," *Peking Review* (June 18, 1965), and Shih Chun, "On Studying Some History of the National Liberation Movement," *Peking Review* (November 19, 1972), pp. 6-9.

20. See Bartke, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-23, 107-125, 173-200, for the statistics of aid, and Hutchison, *op. cit.*, p. 49, for the type of aid and its purpose. See also Hsiung, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

21. For a discussion of China's United Nations participation, see Samuel S. Kim, "Behavioral Dimensions of Chinese Multilateral Diplomacy," *China Quarterly* 72 (December/1977), pp. 713-742, and Bruce Larkin, "Chinese Aid in Political Context, 1971-1973," in Warren Weinstein, ed., *Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa* (New York, 1975), pp. 10-12.

22. For examples see Mark Mancall, "The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 349 (September/1963), pp. 14-26, and John Cranmer-Byng, "The Chinese View of Their Place in the World: An Historical Perspective," *China Quarterly* 53 (Jan-Mar/1973), pp. 65-78. For instances of the transitional filament connecting historical periods, see Joseph Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy* (Berkeley, 1968), and Maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-ch'ao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967). Certainly Mao frequently referred at least analogously to time past, i.e. his reference to Great Harmony, the saying of Pan Ku that "Things that oppose each other also complement each other," and the lessons to be learned from Sung Chiang's "betrayal" in *Shui Hu Chuan.*

23. Benjamin Schwartz, "The Chinese Perception of World Order, Past and Present," in John King Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order, Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968). For further elaboration see Schwartz, "The Maoist Image of World

Order," in his *Communism and China, Ideology in Flux* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp. 228-242; C.P. Fitzgerald, *The Chinese View of Their Place in the World* (London, 1965); Albert Fuerwerker, "Chinese History and the Foreign Relations of Contemporary China," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 402 (July/1972), pp. 1-14; and the implications in Melvin Gurtov, "China's Policies in Southeast Asia: Three Studies," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 3, no. 304 (July-October/1970), pp. 13-68.

24. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1858-1880* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 210.

25. For example, see Jerome Ch'en, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution* (London, 1965), and Hutchison, *op. cit.*, pp. 281-282.

26. Benjamin Schwartz, "China and the West in the Thought of Mao Tse-tung," in Tang Tsou and Ping-ti Ho, ed., *China's Heritage and the Communist Political System*, Bk. I, vol. I (Chicago, 1968), pp. 365-379.

27. A different perspective can be found in Warren Weinstein, "Chinese Policy in Central Africa, 1960-1973," in Weinstein, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

28. See S. N. Eisenstadt, *Tradition, Change and Modernity* (New York, 1973), especially part IV. Note also Kian Kwan and Tamotsu Shibutani, *Ethnic Stratification, A Comparative Approach* (New York, 1965), pp. 579-580.

29. See Stuart Schram, "Historical Perspective," in Schram, ed., *Authority, Participation, and Cultural Change in China* (London, 1973), p. 108.

30. Benjamin Schwartz in Tsou and Ho, *op. cit.*, pp. 365-379.

31. Van Ness, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 197.

34. Larkin, *China and Africa, 1949-1970, op. cit.*, p. 19.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

36. For a discussion of Van Ness, see Michael Yahuda, "The Study of Chinese Foreign Relations," *China Quarterly* 67 (September/1977), pp. 611-621.

37. Actually the literature is abundant, though not plethoric. For examples, see Schwartz, "Chinese Missions and American Policies," in his *Ideology in Flux, op. cit.*, pp. 186-204, and Gurtov, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-68.

38. For elements of this argument, see Arthur A. Cohen, "The Man and His Policies," *Problems of Communism* 15 (September/1970), pp. 8-16, and the comment by Leonard Shapiro, "Totalitarian Traditions," pp. 22-23. Also note Arthur A. Cohen, *The Communism of Mao Tse-tung* (Chicago, 1964). For a power approach to foreign policy, see Harold C. Hinton, *China's Turbulent Quest* (London, 1970).

39. For a role of ideology as an organizational tool, see Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley, 1970), and Richard H. Solomon, "From Commitment to Cant: The Evolving Functions of Ideology in the Revolutionary Process," in Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China* (Seattle, Wash., 1973). A valuable critique of this perspective and a brilliant analysis of the "role" of ideology is presented by Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "The Use and Abuse of Ideology in the Study of Contemporary China," *China Quarterly* 61 (March/1975), pp. 126-152.

40. For an example of this idea, see Weinstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-68.

41. Professor Larkin has identified a new "dichotomy"—that between the most powerful

nations and these smaller and medium-sized countries. See Larkin in Weinstein, *ibid.*, p. 7-8.

42. Schwartz, *Ideology in Flux, op. cit.*, p. 9.

43. For instance, see Ginsburg, *Rationalizing the Demonic, op. cit.*, and Richard Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley, 1971).

44. See an argument about the questionableness of the existence of "facts" in Richard E. Boulding, *The Image* (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1969), pp. 14-15.

45. Wakeman, "The Use and Abuse of Ideology," *op. cit.*, p. 15. Although this paper stresses Mao's cosmology as the essence of Chinese foreign policy, we do not discount other crucial ingredients, including factional politics, post-cultural revolution developments, and the sometimes contradictory and changing aspects of Mao's thought. We feel that the coherence of the Chairman's thought is basically reflected in his writings and that certain tenets persisted during his life and had a profound impact on the formulation of foreign policy.

46. George Yu, *China and Tanzania: A Study of Cooperative Interaction* 5 (Berkeley, 1970), p. 12.

47. Cranmer-Byng, "The Chinese View of Their Place in the World," *op. cit.*, p. 77.

48. *Ibid.*

49. *Ibid.*

50. See John Gittings, "The Origin of China's Foreign Policy," in David Horiwitz, *Containment and Revolution* (Boston, 1967), pp. 182-217; David Mozing, "The Maoist Imprint on China's Foreign Policy," *China Briefing* (Chicago, 1968), pp. 23-51; C. P. Fitzgerald, *China in Southeast Asia since 1945* (London, 1973); Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power, op. cit.* For examples that view China's relations with Africa specifically as a function of Sino-Soviet rivalry, see Charles Neuhauser, *Third World Politics: China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, 1957-1967* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), p. 72. For a recent discussion of Chinese-Soviet contention in Africa, see George Yu, "China's Impact," *Problems of Communism* (Jan-Feb/1978), pp. 40-50.

51. "World in Great Disorder: Excellent Situation," *News Bulletin* (Hsinhau News Agency), January 9, 1974.

52. For such a characterization, see Ginsburg, *op. cit.*, p. 149, and the "Alice in Wonderland" characterization of a "totalistic" world outlook.

53. Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice," in *Selected Works, op. cit.*, vol. 1 (Peking, 1967), pp. 296-297.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 297.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 304.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 308.

57. Wakeman, "The Use and Abuse of Ideology," *op. cit.*, p. 151.

58. Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradictions," *Selected Works, op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 336.

59. *Ibid.*

60. Mao Tse-tung, "Lun shih ta kuan-hsi," and "Tsai Cheng-tu hui-i shang-ti chiang-hau," in *Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung sse-hsiang wan-sui*, Taiwan reprint, 1967 compilation date, 1969 reprint, pp. 40-41 and pp. 168-169. For the best translations of these, see Stuart Schram, ed., *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, Talks and Letters: 1956-1971* (London, 1974). Also see Teng Hsiao-ping's speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations on April 10, 1974; consult *Peking Review* (April 10, 1974), pp. 6-10.

61. Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics* (New York, 1974), p. 358. Schurmann concluded that Mao's view is one of "a volcanic terrain in which there are constantly smaller eruptions here and there and consider it delusion or worse to pretend that this is not so."

62. "On Contradictions," in *Selected Works, op. cit.*, p. 311.

63. Mao Tse-tung, "Tsai Cheng-tu hui-i shang-ti chiang-hau," *op. cit.*, pp. 168-169.

64. Mao, "On Contradictions," *op. cit.*, p. 315.

65. For a different view, see Cohen, *Problems of Communication, op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

66. "Experience and Practice," *Peking Review* (Dec. 2, 1972), p. 17-18

67. "On Contradictions," *op. cit.*, p. 316.

68. *Ibid.*

69. See an explanatory note to *Talks with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong* as quoted in the *Peking Review* (December 13, 1974), "...and adopt proper forms of struggle at different times, in different places, and under different conditions, so as to isolate and wipe out the enemy step by step . . ."

70. Mao, "On Contradictions," *op. cit.*, p. 322. See also Shih Chun, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-9.

71. Note the expulsion of Chinese delegations in Burandi and Dahomey mentioned earlier in the text. Western media and Africans who can benefit from anti-communist fervor have exaggerated these expulsions and have even fabricated incidents. For examples in the anti-communist, anti-Chinese literature, see Douglas Reed, *The Battle for Rhodesia* (New York, 1967); Eschel Rhoodie, *The Third Africa* (New York, 1968); and Emmanuel Levi, *An African Student in China* (London, 1962).

72. See Pierre Uri, *Development without Dependence* (New York, 1976) and George Shepherd, *Nonaligned Black Africa* (Lexington, 1970).

73. Nationalism itself was partially shaped by the colonial legacy, and this is evident in looking at our working definition of African nationalism. However, it was not limited to such a narrow development. Nationalism in Africa had indigenous roots and dynamics which produced an African ideology. The nature of this ideology as practiced by African nationalists was limited by the impact that the colonial legacy had on them, both as individuals and as groups.

74. For a discussion of the colonial legacy, see Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar es Salaam, 1972); Irving Markovitz, ed., *African Politics and Society* (New York, 1970), Parts I and II; James Mayall, *Africa: The Cold War and After* (London, 1971); Vincent Thompson, *Africa and Unity* (London, 1969); and Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya* (Berkeley, 1974).

75. Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (New York, 1963), p. 184.

76. For a discussion of Negritude, see Irving Markovitz, *Leopold Sedar Senghor and the Politics of Negritude* (New York, 1969) and J. D. Hargreaves, *West Africa: The Former French States* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1967).

77. See James Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Los Angeles, 1958); Nnamdi Azikiwe, *My Odyssey: An Autobiography* (New York, 1971); Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana* (New York, 1957); Harry Thuku, *Harry Thuku: An Autobiography* (London, 1971); Robert Rotberg, *The Rise of African Nationalism in Central Africa* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); and F. U. Ohaegbula, *Nationalism in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa* (Washington, D.C., 1977).

78. The former High Commission Territories in Southern Africa never developed mass nationalisms that called for the ouster of the colonialists. Neither did colonies such as the

Belgian Congo broaden their mass support for African nationalism prior to independence. See Richard Stevens, *Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland* (New York, 1967), and Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo* (Princeton, 1965).

79. This model African nationalism was developed by Virginia Bollinger and Jack Bermingham in an unpublished seminar paper, "African Nationalism and Ethnicity in Southern Africa," for a conference on resistance to colonial rule in Southern Africa held in Los Angeles in 1976. Two prominent works of African nationalism are Ohaegbula, *op. cit.*, and Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (New York, 1957).

80. Nationalism was not simply a reactionary movement responding on a "gut level" to colonial domination. It was marked by hope for a future designed by and for Africans. For example, see Ndabaningi Sithole, *Roots of a Revolution* (London, 1977).

81. See Julius Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism* (New York, 1968).

82. For more detailed observations, see Ali Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana* (Chicago, 1967), Semakula Kiwanuka, *From Colonialism to Independence* (Nairobi, 1973), and Amilcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea* (New York, 1969).

83. The proponents of Negritude were predominantly from the former French colonies. They viewed colonial rule as cultural oppression. Many had served in the French Chamber of Deputies, so they never felt politically impotent. Their problems stemmed from the loss of their indigenous culture. To regain an African perspective, they redefined their cultural orientation, which tended to exclude a framework for political aspirations. Consequently, nonalignment was less of an issue for the Francophone African states. For a discussion of some of these issues, see Pierre Abelin, *La Politique Française de Cooperation* (Paris, 1975) and Renè Dumont, *False Start in Africa* (2nd ed., New York, 1969).

84. Hargreaves, *op. cit.*

85. See Agrippah Mugomba and Muogo Nyaggah, eds., *Independence without Freedom: The Political Economy of Colonial Education in Southern Africa* (Santa Barbara, 1980), for a discussion of the impact of colonial education on Africans.

86. For example, see Patrick Keatley, *The Politics of Partnership* (Baltimore, 1965).

87. See Olajide Aluko, *The Foreign Policies of African States* (London, 1977); G. de Lusignan, *French-Speaking Africa since Independence* (London, 1969); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of Independence* (New York,1961); and Michael Crowder, *Senegal* (London, 1967).

88. See D. C. Mulford, *Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964* (London, 1967), Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite, op. cit.*, and Gwendolen Carter, ed., *African One-Party States* (Ithaca, 1962).

89. Interview with the Hon. M. Mpho, M. P., Gaborone, Botswana (August/1977). See I. William Zartman, "Africa and Europe: Decolonization or Dependency?" in *Foreign Affairs* 54, no. 2 (January/1976), pp. 325-343. See also Leys, *op. cit.*; Basil Davidson, *Can Africa Survive?* (London, 1975); and Carl Widstrand, ed., *Multinational Firms in Africa* (Uppsala, 1975).

90. Zartman, *op. cit.*

91. Note Tanzania's difficulties with formal relations with West Germany and Tanzanian efforts to expand relations with East Germany. The resulting ramifications for aid programs were not settled until the two Germanys recognized each other through diplomatic exchanges.

92. Perhaps the most prominent examples were Nkrumah in Ghana, Kaunda in Zambia, Nyerere in Tanzania, Banda in Malawi, Senghor in Senegal, and Houphouet-Boigny in the Ivory Coast.

93. Crawford Young, *op. cit.*

94. See the two volumes by Julius Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity* (London, 1966), and *Freedom and Socialism* (London, 1968) for an elaboration of this aspiration. Note also the October, 1971 *New Yorker* series on Nyerere by W. E. Smith.

95. The West refused to support the Tanzania-Zambia railroad project when initially requested. Instead, Western nations countered with an offer to build a surface road. Since the railroad was also designed to enhance the political and economic independence of Zambia and Tanzania, it was deemed essential by the two African countries. Yet the West was shocked to find that an aid program with the People's Republic of China for the building of the railway had been consummated. The result was wild recrimination in the United States, Europe, and some parts of Africa (especially Southern Africa) claiming that Tanzania was going "communist." See the *New Yorker* series, *op. cit.*, and Julius Neyerere, "The Costs of Non-Alignment," in *Africa Report* 11, no. 7 (October/1966), pp. 61-67.

96. W. E. Smith, "Profiles: President Nyerere," *The New Yorker*, (October 30, 1971).

97. Note the Friendship Textile Mill at the Ruvu State Farm. See Ali Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations* (Boulder, 1977), pp. 181-129.

98. David Johns, "The Foreign Policy of Tanzania," in O. Aluko, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-219. See also Ali Mazrui, "Socialism as a Model of International Protest," in *Protest and Power in Black America*, Robert Rotberg and Ali Mazrui eds. (New York, 1970), pp. 1139-1152.

99. W. E. Smith, *op. cit.*

100. See Adekunle Ajala, *Pan-Africanism* (New York, 1973); Henry Bretten, *Power and Politics in Africa* (Chicago, 1973); Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa* (New Haven, 1976); Martin Minogue and Judith Molloy, eds., *African Aims and Attitudes* (London, 1974); Shepherd, *op. cit*; and Zartman, *op. cit.*

101. For some information on this topic, see Olajide Aluko, ed., *The Foreign Policies of African States, op. cit* The data necessary to achieve this task are generally unavailable or inaccessible, with the result that the essays in the volume are largely descriptive and/or speculative.

102. See Decalo, *op. cit.*; Robert Pinkeny, *Ghana under Military Rule, 1966-1969* (London, 1972); Claude Welch, *Soldier and State in Africa* (Evanston, Ill., 1970); William Gutteridge, *Military Regimes in Africa* (London, 1975); Ruth First, *The Barrel of a Gun* (Harmondsworth, 1970); John Lee, *African Armies and Civil Order* (London, 1969); Ernest Lefever, *Spear and Scepter: Army, Police, and Politics in Tropical Africa* (Washington, 1970); Ali Mazrui and Hasu Patel, eds., *Africa in World Affairs* (New York, 1973); and Ali Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations, op. cit.*

103. For a discussion of the problems in the drive for Congolese (Zaire) independence, see Crawford Young, *op. cit.*; Colin Legum, *Congo Disaster* (Baltimore, 1961); Ernest Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo* (Washington, 1965); Roger Anstey, *King Leopold's Legacy* (London, 1966); and Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence* (London, 1965).

104. See Renè Lemarchand, "Patrice Lumumba," in W.A.E. Skunnik, ed., *African Political Thought* (Denver, 1968); *Patrice Lumumba: Fighter for Africa's Freedom* (Moscow, 1966); and Stephen Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964* (Ithaca, 1974).

105. Weissman, *op. cit.* See also Jean van Lierde, *La pensèe politique de Patrice Lumumba* (Paris, 1963).

106. *Ibid.*

107. For example, see B. Botombele, *Cultural Policy in the Republic of Zaire* (New York, 1976).

108. Thomas Kanza, "Zaire's Foreign Policy," in Aluko, *op. cit.*, p.241.

109. Note the recent troubles in the Shaba Province. Western military assistance was given to protect the expanded Western corporate interests and to maintain President Mobutu's position. For the expanded Western presence, see *New African Development* 11 (January/1977), pp. 69-71. See also *Africa Confidential* 9, nos. 2, 8, 13, 17, 24 (1978) and *African Business* 1, no.1 (September/1978), pp. 22-23.

110. Decalo, *op. cit.*, p. 82, discusses Benin (Dahomey) and China. See also Jeffrey Strate, "Post-Military Coup Strategy in Uganda: Amin's Early Attempts to Consolidate Political Support," in *Papers in International Studies: Africa Series*, no. 18 (Athens, 1973), and Welch, *op. cit.*

111. Ohaegbulam, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-53. See also Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite, op. cit.*; Hodgkin, *op. cit.*; and Mary Benson, *The African Patriots* (London, 1963).

112. This tendency can be the result of the continuing colonial legacy. The Balkanization of Africa has made cooperation among African states difficult. These problems have enhanced Western influences and have permitted neocolonialism to expand. See Ann Seidman and Reginald Green, *Unity or Poverty* (Baltimore, 1968); Ohaegbulam, *op. cit.*; and Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite, op. cit.*

113. Julius Nyerere, "Rhodesia in the Context of Southern Africa," in *Foreign Affairs* 44, no. 3 (April/1966), p. 374. See also Neyerere, *Freedom and Development* (London, 1973), pp. 159-172, 243-256, 351-367, and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *Southern Africa* (New York, 1976), pp. 7-9.

114. This differs particularly from Chinese policy development. Africans remained tied to many of the old colonial networks in economics and politics in most states. Their ability to transcend the resulting constraints were limited to a few issues only. Southern Africa was the most prominent as well as the most uncompromising. See Ali Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations, op. cit.*, Chapter 10.

115. See Kenneth Grundy, *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa* (Berkeley, 1973); Alex La Guma, *Apartheid* (New York, 1971); Anthony Lake, *The "Tar Baby" Option* (New York, 1976); Africa Research Group, *Race to Power* (Garden City, N. Y., 1974); and Ndabaningi Sithole, *In Defense of the Rhodesian Constitutional Agreement* (Salisbury, 1978).

116. Ndabaningi Sithole, *African Nationalism* (London, 1968), pp. 187-188.

117. Note the earlier Zaire example as well as the Tanzania-Zambia railway.

118. See Hutchison, *op. cit.*, Part II. For a recent discussion of nonalignment, see A. W. Singham, *The Non-Aligned Movement in World Politics* (Westport, Conn., 1977). It is interesting to note the significant increase in African leaders' state visits to China and the expansion of other contacts with China. These are usually detailed in *Africa Confidential, New African Development,* and *African Business.*

119. Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations, op. cit.*, Chapter 3.

120. See Ladipo Adamolekun, "The Foreign Policy of Guinea," in Aluko, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-117. See also Johns, *op. cit.*; Timothy Niblick, "Tanzanian Foreign Policy: An Analysis," in *The African Review* 2, no. 2 (September/1971), pp. 91-101; Adamolekun, *Sékou Touré's Guinea* (London, 1976); and J. Dunn, ed., *West African States* (London, 1978).

121. Interview with the Honorable A. Mogwe, Foreign Minister, Gaborone, Botswana (August/1977). See also Agrippah Mugomba, *The Foreign Policy of Despair: Africa and the Sale of Arms to South Africa* (Nairobi, 1977); *Race to Power, op. cit.*; SIPRI, *Southern Africa, op. cit.*; Mohammed El-Khawas, ed., *The Kissinger Study on Southern Africa* (Nottingham, 1975); Ann and Neva Seidman, *Multi-Nationals in Southern Africa* (Dar es Salaam, 1977); and

Wolf Roder, ed., *Voices of Liberation in Southern Africa* (Waltham, Mass., 1972).

122. Quoted from a 1957 *People's Daily* editorial in Hutchison, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

123. Van Ness, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

124. *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement* (Peking, 1965), p. 7. This statement indicates that Mao may have identified imperialism as the main contradiction and the view is borne out by his speech in 1962 and the Tenth Plenum in which the principle was the struggle between imperialism and the people of the world. See Mao Tse-tung, "Tasi pa-chieh shih-chung ch'un huei chang ti hau," *Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang, op. cit.*, p. 433.

125. Julius Nyerere strongly reminded all parties of this fact at the Moshi Conference in February of 1963. For more along this line, see Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism, op. cit.*, pp. 191-196.

126. "Taking the world situation as a whole, the contradiction between the oppressed nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and imperialism headed by the United States is the principal contradiction in the contemporary world." Quoted from *Hung Ch'i* 6 (1965), p. 4, in Van Ness, *op. cit.*, p. 24. For the conversion to "big power hegemonism" Chinese publications abounded. See as a typical example, "Hail the Successful Conclusion of the 4th Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries," *Peking Review* 38 (September 21, 1973), pp. 10-11. See also Albert Meister, *L'Afrique peut elle partir?* (Paris, 1966), especially pp. 318-319.

127. Larkin, *op. cit.*, p. 174, and Hutchison, *op. cit*, pp. 236-237.

128. The Chinese press has constantly emphasized this point since 1969, eventually stressing the new "social imperialism" of the Soviet Union. For examples, see "New Year Message," *Peking Review* (January 5, 1973), p. 11; "Oppose Big Powers Seeking Hegemony," *ibid.* (April 7, 1973), p. 13-15; "Awakening and Growth of the Third World," *ibid.* (January 18, 1974), pp. 11-12; "Premier Chou's Remarks," *ibid.* (March 1, 1974), p. 19; and "China and Comoros Establish Relations," *ibid.* (November 28, 1975), p. 4.

129. For a view of this change, see George Yu, "China's Competitive Diplomacy in Africa," in Jerome A. Cohen, ed. *The Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 69-87. For a view that discusses the idea that the changing African scene helped precipitate this, see Ogunsanwo, *op. cit.* Ogunsanwo called the shift "revolutionary pragmatism"—the facing of the realities of Africa while trying to remain loyal to revolution through national liberation movements.

130. Larkin in Weinstein, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

131. "Third World Struggle Against Hegemony," *Peking Review* (September 22, 1973), pp. 13-15. The policy was forcibly articulated by An Chih-yuan in 1973: "We hold that the people of each country have the right to choose the social system of their own country according to their own will and to safeguard the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of their country, and that no country has the right to subject another country to its aggression, subversion, control, interference, or bullying. We are opposed to the power politics and hegemonism of the big bullying the small and the strong bullying the weak." For a strong condemnation of Brezhnev, see "Moscow Revisionists Cannot Escape Exposure by History," *News Bulletin* (Hsinhua News Agency) (March 12,1976), p. 8.

132. At one point even Lt. General Tran Van Tra was quoted as saying that the reunited Vietnam would remain disengaged from the Sino-Soviet dispute. See "Plan for the Nation-Wide Election," *Los Angeles Times*, Pt. I, (May 12, 1975), p. 8.

133. As an example of Nyerere's views, see *The Nationalist*, Dar es Salaam (October 7, 1969), and "President Nyerere's Speech," *Peking Review* (March 29, 1974), pp. 8-9.

134. For a discussion of Soviet-African relations, see Colin Legum, *Problems of Communism, op. cit.*; Helen Desfosses Cohn, *Soviet Policy Toward Black Africa* (New York, 1973); and Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations, op. cit.*, Chapter 9.

135. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite, op. cit.*

136. This statement of self-reliance is crucial to the Maoist penchant for change and has been stressed time and again by the Chinese from the days of the Kiangsi Soviet to the 1949 culmination of liberation, through Lin Piao's article, "Long Live the People's Revolutionary War," to present-day prognostications.

137. Bartke, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-12.

138. For a discussion of Neto and his nonalliance, see *The Observer*(August/1970).

139. This was especially true after the Czechoslovakian invasion and the announcement of the "Brezhnev Doctrine." See Hutchison, *op. cit*, pp. 162-163,and also Legum, "The African Environment," *op. cit*, pp. 5-11.

140. *Observer* (January/1967).

141. For an example of support for Mozambique, see "A Strong Condemnation of the Rhodesian Reactionary Regime's Aggression,"*Jen-min Jih-pao*(March 13, 1976). The commentator wrote: "The Chinese people strongly condemn the Rhodesian racists for their crimes and support the Mozambique government and people in their struggle against aggression."

142. These programs have reportedly created strains, in that the cultural differences between the Chinese and the African students have caused some ill feelings on the part of the African trainees.

143. See "A Strong Condemnation of the Rhodesian Reactionary Regime's Aggression," *op. cit.* "Africa belongs to the African people and no one can change the excellent situation in which the African people win successive victories in the struggle for national liberation." The article also warns of the continuing "contradiction" posed by the Soviet Union. "The Soviet social imperialists are hatching new plans in the wake of their armed intervention in Angola . . . (but) . . . final victory belongs to the people of Mozambique, Zimbabwe and the whole of Africa."

144. Hutchison, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-257. See also *African Development* (April/1976), p. 343.

145. See a recent account of aid in *New African* (November/1978),p. 75.

146. For elaboration of this point, see Hutchison, *op. cit.*, pp.230-231.

147. Tseng Yun, "How China Carries Out the Policy of Self-Reliance," *PekingReview* (June 18, 1965), p. 14.

148. *African Development* (November/1973), p. 513.

149. *News Bulletin* (Hsinhau News Agency) (June 25, 1973). For the African leeriness of the Soviet Union, see also Legum, "The African Environment," *op. cit.*

150. Peking often stresses the continuance of hegemonistic designs by the "superpowers" in the U. N. For instance, see Huang Hau's speech, December 15, 1971, as reported in *Peking Review* (December 24, 1971), p. 11. Also see the An Chih-huan speech at the plenary session on April 12, 1973 of the U. N.'s ECAFE meeting in Tokyo, reprinted in *Peking Review* (April 20, 1973), pp. 13-15. Also see Teng Hsiao-ping's speech before the U. N. General Assembly, April 10, 1974, as reported in *Peking Review* (April 19, 1974), pp. 6-10.

151. *News Bulletin* (Hsinhau News Agency) (June 25, 1973).

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